For most of the past thirty years, Japan was the country where interest rates did not exist. The central bank’s policy rate sat at or below zero, and for a time it also capped the yield on ten-year government bonds. The aim was to end decades of falling prices.
That era is over. Since March 2024 the Bank of Japan has raised its policy rate six times, to 1.25%. By the standards of other countries that is still low. By Japan’s, it is the highest in a generation, and the change is working its way through markets well beyond Tokyo.
What the Bank of Japan has done
The sequence is worth setting out, because its gradualness is the point:
| Date | Decision |
|---|---|
| March 2024 | Ends negative rates and its cap on bond yields |
| July 2024 | Raises the policy rate to 0.25%; begins reducing bond purchases |
| January 2025 | 0.5% |
| December 2025 | 0.75% |
| June 2026 | 1.0% |
| September 2026 | 1.25% |
| October 2026 | No change; one board member votes for 1.5% |
Alongside the rate increases, the Bank has been buying fewer government bonds each quarter. It expects to hold about 17% fewer by March 2027 than in mid-2024. It has also begun selling the shares it accumulated through exchange-traded funds, at a pace that will take decades.
Why now
The Bank’s condition for raising rates was sustained inflation of about 2%, supported by rising wages. Prices excluding fresh food were 2.1% higher in September 2026 than a year before, and a measure that also strips out energy stood at 2.4%.
Whether that is durable is contested, including inside the Bank. Its board has recorded dissenting votes in both directions during 2026.
First consequence: the government’s borrowing costs
Japan has more public debt relative to its economy than any other large country, about twice its annual output on IMF figures. For years that was cheap to carry because interest rates were close to zero.
It is becoming less cheap. In September 2026 the government sold 40-year bonds at a yield above 4%. The Ministry of Finance has responded by issuing fewer very long-dated bonds, cutting planned sales of 20-, 30- and 40-year debt by nearly a third for the current fiscal year.
The effect on the budget is gradual, since only new borrowing and refinancing pay the higher rate. The IMF notes that the debt ratio is currently falling, because inflation and growth are raising the size of the economy in yen terms, even as interest costs climb. That balance depends on fiscal restraint, which is why proposals for tax cuts attract so much attention from bond investors.
Second consequence: the yen
Textbook logic says a currency should strengthen when its interest rates rise. The yen has not obliged.
The clearest evidence is what the authorities have had to do. The Ministry of Finance intervened to support the yen twice in 2026, spending ¥11.7 trillion over a few days around the start of May and ¥15.4 trillion at the end of July, the latter including the largest single day of intervention it has reported.
Two explanations are commonly offered. One is that Japanese rates, though rising, remain far below those in the United States, where the Federal Reserve also raised rates in 2026. The other is concern about public finances. The data do not let us choose between them.
A weak yen cuts both ways. It raises the cost of imported energy and food for households. It also inflates the yen value of profits earned abroad: Toyota reported that exchange rates added ¥685 billion to its operating income in just six months.
Third consequence: Japan’s money abroad
Decades of low returns at home pushed Japanese households, insurers and pension funds to invest abroad. The country’s net overseas assets stood at ¥562 trillion at the end of 2025, among the largest of any nation, and it is the biggest foreign holder of US government bonds.
Higher yields at home change the calculation for those investors. If a Japanese insurer can earn 3% or 4% on its own government’s bonds without currency risk, it has less reason to buy American or European ones. Japan’s holdings of US Treasuries fell by about $126 billion in the year to September 2026.
Caution is needed before drawing a conclusion from that number. The government sells foreign reserves when it intervenes, and bond prices changed over the period; either could account for much of the fall. What can be said is that the direction of the incentive has changed, and that a sustained shift would matter for borrowing costs far from Japan.
The carry trade
There is a faster-moving channel too. For years investors around the world borrowed yen cheaply to buy higher-yielding assets elsewhere, a strategy known as the carry trade. When Japanese rates rise or the yen jumps, those positions lose money and are closed quickly, which can force sales of unrelated assets.
This happened in August 2024, when a modest rate increase coincided with weak US data and markets fell sharply for several days. The Bank for International Settlements described it as an unwinding of leveraged positions amplified by forced selling, and offered a rough estimate of ¥40 trillion for the size of yen carry trades, while cautioning that the data are incomplete.
The episode is a reminder that the risk from Japan’s normalisation lies less in the level of rates than in the speed of adjustment.
What to take from it
Japan is conducting, in slow motion, an experiment no other large economy has tried: leaving behind near-zero interest rates with a public debt of twice national income. So far it has proceeded without crisis. The places to watch for strain are the long end of the government bond market, the yen, and the flow of Japanese savings abroad, each of which has official data published monthly.

